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Abstract
We generalize the Shapley-Shubik market model for indivisible goods by
considering the case where agents need middlemen to exchange their indivisible
goods. In this model, there always exist competitive equilibria in which trans-
action takes place directly between sellers and buyers or indirectly through
the middlemen. Furthermore, the incentives of middlemen to enter the market
exist. We derive these results from the existence of an integral solution for a
partitioning linear program.
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1 Introduction
The seminal paper of Shapley and Shubik [1] analyzed a competitive market
for indivisible goods, namely an assignment market. In the assignment market,
each seller owns one unit of indivisible goods initially and she wants to sell it;
and each buyer wants to purchase at most one unit of the indivisible goods.
Shapley and Shubik showed that there always exists a competitive equilibrium
which attains e¢ ciency. Many economists have applied the assignment market
model to analyses of housing markets and labor markets, e.g., Kaneko [2], and
Kelso and Crawford [3].
In the real world, there are also various assignment markets with middle-
men, e.g., housing markets with real estate brokers and intermediate labor
markets. Introducing models di¤erent from the assignment market model,
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several researchers have investigated markets for indivisible goods with mid-
dlemen, e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky [4], Johri and Leach [5], Blume et al.
[6], and Yano [7].1
Although the existing literature gives some insight into the study of markets
with middlemen, the following important questions may be still left for us:
When does a competitive equilibrium with middlemen exist? Do middlemen
yield e¢ cient allocations? Do the incentives of middlemen to enter the market
exist?
Toward the purpose of our paper, we generalize the Shapley and Shubiks
model by considering the case where agents need middlemen to exchange their
indivisible goods. This situation can correspond to a lack of information on
the both sides of the market or to inhibitive transaction costs. Here, search
cost and matching cost are considered. Matching cost is regarded as oppor-
tunity cost for matching agents who search trading partners. Furthermore,
middlemen are supposed to be matchmakers. The role of the middlemen is
borrowed from Rubinstein and Wolinsky [4]. Middlemen can eliminate search
costs of sellers and buyers by matching them, but the middlemen incur their
matching costs. A prot of middlemen is interpreted as a brokerage fee. In
addition, we assume that middlemen have the same matching skill, namely
the matching cost is identical. Under this simple setting, it would be easy for
us to understand how middlemen are related to the existence of a competitive
equilibrium.
In this paper, we show that a competitive equilibrium with (resp. without)
middlemen, which attains e¢ ciency, always exists if (i) the sum of the matching
costs of each seller and each buyer is relatively higher (resp. lower) than the
matching cost of each middleman, and (ii) the number of middlemen (resp.
marketplaces) is not less than the number of potential assignments of goods.
The number of potential assignments is given by the minimum of the number
of sellers (goods) and the number of buyers. We also show that the incentives
of middlemen to enter the market always exist under the situation where the
number of middlemen is equal to the number of the potential assignments of
goods.
The results mentioned above are obtained by using a partitioning linear
program proposed by Quint [8]. Using this linear program, Quint showed
that the existence of an integral solution for the partitioning linear program
guarantees emptiness of the core of multi-sided assignment games. On the
other hand, our paper highlights an application of the partitioning linear pro-
gram to an economic analysis of middlemen. By using the methodology in our
1Rubinstein and Wolinsky [4] and Johri and Leach [5] investigated the activity of mid-
dlemen who play a role of matchmakers from the viewpoint of search theory. Blume et al.
[6] presented a trading network model in which each middleman is a market maker. Yano
[7] incorporated outside competitive forces of middlemen in his market bargaining model in
order to deal with a certain fairness in an M&A market.
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paper, we can generalize our results easily in the context of middlemen who
deal with multiple units of indivisible goods and who have di¤erent matching
skill, respectively.2 Therefore, our paper focuses on the simple model proposed
here rather than a generalized model.
2 The model
We introduce an assignment market model with middlemen under a certain
cost structure. Let N1 = fi1; i2; : : : ; in1g and N3 = fk1; k2; : : : ; kn3g be the set
of sellers and the set of buyers, respectively. We dene the set of middlemen as
Jm = fjm1 ; jm2 ; : : : ; jmnmg, and the set of dummy middlemen as Jd = fjd1 ; jd2 ; : : : ;
jdndg. A dummymiddleman is interpreted as amarketplace in which a seller and
a buyer trade each other and they incur search costs. A middleman plays a role
of a matchmaker who incurs matching costs. Matching costs are opportunity
costs for matching agents who search trading partners. Let N2 be the set of
all types of middlemen, namely N2 = Jm [ Jd and jN2j = n2 = nm+ nd. Note
that n1; nm; nd; n3 2 N.3 Let N = N1 [N2 [N3:
There are n1 kinds of indivisible goods, and they are exchanged for money.
Each seller i 2 N1 owns only one unit of indivisible goods initially, namely
!i = 1. Each middleman and each buyer own no unit of goods initially. Each
middleman deals with at most one unit of goods between sellers and buyers.
Each buyer consumes at most one unit of goods.
Assume that nd > minfn1; n3g. This means that the number of market-
places is larger than the potential assignments of goods. In other words, there
are many opportunities in which sellers and buyers meet each other.
Let us denote the demand and the supply of this market as follows. The
notation we adopt is useful for formalizing the competitive equilibrium.
Sellers side: Each seller i chooses one of the followings: (i) she sells one
unit of her goods to a middleman in Jm; (ii) she sells it to a buyer through
a dummy middleman (i.e. marketplace) in Jd, and she incurs her search cost
ci  0; (iii) she consumes her goods by herself. Let xi be the consumption of
seller i; namely xi 2 f0; 1g:
Middlemens side: Each middleman j in N2 wants to sell at most one unit
of goods to only a buyer. For this purpose, each middleman purchases at
most one unit of goods from only a seller. Let the matching cost of each
middleman j 2 N2 be given by cjm  0 for each jm 2 Jm and cjd = 0 for each
jd 2 Jd. Let ~xij be the supply of seller i 2 N1 to middleman j 2 N2, namely
2For the detail in the case of multiple trading by each middleman, see Oishi and Sakaue
[9]. For the detail of an assignment market model with heterogeneous middlemen, see Oishi
[10].
3We denote by N the set of natural numbers.
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~xij 2 f0; 1g. Note that each middleman j 2 N2 consumes no unit of goods
which the middleman purchases from seller i 2 N1.
Buyersside: Each buyer k chooses one of the followings in order to consume
at most one unit of goods: (i) she purchases at most one unit of goods from
only a middleman in Jm; (ii) she purchases at most one unit of goods from
a seller through a dummy middleman in Jd, and she incurs her search cost
ck  0: Let xijk be the consumption of buyer k, namely xijk 2 f0; 1g. In the
case of xijk = 1, buyer k 2 N3 demands one unit of goods which middleman
j 2 N2 purchases from seller i 2 N1. Moreover, let ~xijk be the supply of
middleman j 2 N2, namely ~xijk 2 f0; 1g. In the case of ~xijk = 1, middleman
j 2 N2 supplies to buyer k 2 N3 one unit of goods which the middleman
purchases from seller i 2 N1.
The set of feasible allocations of sellers, middlemen and buyers are given by
conditions A1; A2 and A3, respectively.
A1 : For all i 2 N1; Xi  f(xi; (~xij)j2N2) 2 Z1+n2+ : xi +
P
j2N2 ~xij = !i = 1g:
A2 : For all j 2 N2; Xj  f(~xijk)i2N1;k2N3 2 Zn1n3+ :
P
i2N1
P
k2N3 ~xijk  1g:
A3 : For all k 2 N3; Xk  f(xijk)i2N1;j2N2 2 Zn1n2+ :
P
i2N1
P
j2N2 xijk  1g:
Each seller and each buyer have utility functions on consumption, which
are measured in terms of money. These functions of each seller and each buyer
are given by Ui : Z+ ! R for all i 2 N1 and Uk : Zn1n2+ ! R for all k 2
N3, respectively.4 The functions Ui() and Uk() are non-decreasing. Assume
Ui(0) = 0 and Uk(0) = 0.5 Let !
j
i = (0; : : : ; 0; e
j
i ; 0; : : : ; 0) 2 Zn1n2+ , where
eji = 1. By e
j
i , we mean that middleman j 2 N2 exchanges one unit of goods
!i. We denote by Uk(!
j
i ) the utility outcome of buyer k if she consumes seller
is goods through middleman j 2 N2.
For each (i; k) 2 N1  N3, m;m0 2 Jm with m 6= m0, and d; d0 2 Jd with
d 6= d0, Uk(!mi ) = Uk(!m0i ) and Uk(!di ) = Uk(!d0i ). This assumption means that
for an arbitrarily xed i 2 N1 and an arbitrarily xed k 2 N3 buyer ks utility
is invariant whenever each middleman j 2 Jm (resp. each dummy middleman
j 2 Jd) matches seller i with buyer k. Under the assumption, middlemen
have the same matching skill, namely the matching cost is identical. Let
cjm = cm  0 for all jm 2 Jm, where cm is constant.
Each middleman j in Jm purchases at most one unit of goods at a price pmi 2
R+ from seller i. Also, middleman j in Jm sells at most one unit of i0s initial
goods at a price qmi 2 R+ to buyer k. Similarly, each dummy middleman j
in Jd purchases at most one unit of goods at a price pdi 2 R+ from seller i.
Also, dummy middleman j in Jd sells at most one unit of i0s initial goods
4We denote by Z and R the set of integral numbers and the set of real numbers, respec-
tively.
50 = (0; : : : ; 0) where 0 2 Zn1n2+ :
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at a price qdi 2 R+ to buyer k. We denote by p = (pmi ; pdi )i2N1 2 R2n1+ and
q = (qmi ; q
d
i )i2N1 2 R2n1+ the lists of prices.
Utility outcomes of all agents are given by the followings.
 For all i 2 N1, Ui(xi) + (pdi   ci)
P
j2Jd ~xij + p
m
i
P
j2Jm ~xij:
 For all j 2 Jm,  Pi2N1 pmi (Pk2N3 ~xijk) +Pi2N1Pk2N3(qmi   cj)~xijk:
 For all j 2 Jd,  Pi2N1 pdi (Pk2N3 ~xijk) +Pi2N1Pk2N3 qdi ~xijk:
 For all k 2 N3, Uk((xijk)i2N1;j2N2) 
P
i2N1
P
j2Jd(q
d
i+ck)xijk 
P
i2N1
P
j2Jm q
m
i xijk:
The utility outcome of each seller i 2 N1 is interpreted as follows: This
utility outcome consists of three components. The rst component is seller
is utility from self-consumption of !i. The second component is seller is net
prot derived from that the seller sells !i to a buyer through a dummy middle-
man in Jd. In this situation, seller i incurs search cost ci. The third component
is seller is revenue derived from that the seller sells !i to a middleman in Jm.
The utility outcome of each middleman j 2 N2 is interpreted as follows:
This utility outcome consists of three components. The rst component is
the cost derived from that the middleman (resp. the dummy middleman)
purchases one unit of goods from a seller. The second component is the revenue
derived from that the middleman (resp. dummy middleman) sells one unit of
goods to a buyer. The third component is matching costs. If a middleman is
a dummy middleman, the third component is dropped.
The utility outcome of each buyer k 2 N3 is interpreted as follows: This
utility outcome consists of three components. The rst component is buyer ks
utility from her consumption of !i through a middleman in N2. The second
component is buyer ks costs derived from her search and her payment to a
seller if the buyer transacts with a seller directly. The third component is
buyer ks costs derived from her payment to a seller if the buyer transacts
with a seller indirectly through a middleman in Jm.
The following conditions A4 and A5 are the market-clearing conditions.
A4 : For all (i; j) 2 N1 N2;
P
k2N3 ~xijk = ~xij:
A5 : For all (i; j; k) 2 N1 N2 N3; xijk = ~xijk:
A tuple (p^; q^; x^) = ((p^mi ; p^
d
i )i2N1 ; (q^
m
i ; q^
d
i )i2N1 ; ((x^i)i2N1 ; (x^ijk)i2N1;j2N2;k2N3)) 2
R2n1+ R2n1+ Zn1+n1n2n3+ is called a competitive equilibrium if (p^; q^; x^) satises
(I): for all i 2 N1; Ui(x^i) + maxfp^di   ci; pmi g(!i   x^i)
=max(xi;(~xij)j2N2 )2Xi
h
Ui(xi) + (p
d
i   ci)
P
j2Jd ~xij + p
m
i
P
j2Jm ~xij
i
;
(II): for all j 2 Jm;Pi2N1Pk2N3(q^mi   p^mi   cj)x^ijk
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= max(~xijk)i2N1;k2N32Xj
P
i2N1
P
k2N3(q^
m
i   p^mi   cj)~xijk

;
(III): for all j 2 Jd;Pi2N1Pk2N3(q^di   p^di )x^ijk
= max(~xijk)i2N1;k2N32Xj
P
i2N1
P
k2N3(q^
d
i   p^di )~xijk

;
(IV): for all k 2 N3; Uk((x^ijk)i2N1;j2N2)  
P
i2N1f(q^di + ck)
P
j2Jd x^ijk +
q^mi
P
j2Jm x^ijkg
= max(xijk)i2N1;j2N22Xk
h
Uk((xijk)i2N1;j2N2) 
P
i2N1f(q^di + ck)
P
j2Jd xijk + q^
m
i
P
j2Jm xijkg
i
;
and
(V): for all i 2 N1; x^i +
P
j2N2
P
k2N3 x^ijk = !i(= 1):
Condition (I), (II), (III), and (IV) are the utility-maximizing conditions
for each seller, each middleman, each dummy middleman, and each buyer,
respectively. These conditions are standard in economics. Condition (V) is
equivalent to A1 through A5, and it means the equilibrium conditions for all
goods.
We call (p^; q^) a competitive equilibrium price if there exists a competi-
tive equilibrium (p^; q^; x^): Then a competitive outcome is given by (u^; v^; w^) 2
Rn1+n2+n3, where u^i; v^j; and w^k are the utility outcomes of seller i 2 N1;
middleman j 2 N2; and buyer k 2 N3 in equilibrium (p^; q^; x^), respectively.
3 Results
We need a linear program in order to assert the results. Let  be the matching
structure between the agents in N , namely   ffigji 2 Ng [ ffi; j; kgji 2
N1; j 2 N2; k 2 N3g. Let y = (yT )T2 2 Rjj. Following Quint [11], let
a  (aT )T2 2 Rn+n1n2n3+ satisfying (i) afig = Ui(!i) for all i 2 N1; (ii) afjg =
afkg = 0 for all j 2 N2 and all k 2 N3; (iii) afi;j;kg = Uk(!ji )   ci   ck for
all (i; j; k) 2 N1  Jd  N3; and (iv) afi;j;kg = Uk(!ji )   cj for all (i; j; k) 2
N1JmN3. Note that afi;j;kg is the social surplus yielded by the transaction
between seller i 2 N1 and buyer k 2 N3 through middleman j 2 N2. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume afi;j;kg  0 for all (i; j; k) 2 N1 N2 N3.6
6One may weaken this assumption, namely afi;j;kg = maxfUk(!ji )   ci   ck; 0g for all
(i; j; k) 2 N1  Jd N3 and afi;j;kg = maxfUk(!ji )  cj ; 0g for all (i; j; k) 2 N1  Jm N3.
Under this assumption, almost all of our results are invariant. In this paper, we adopt the
simple assumption of afi;j;kg.
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The partitioning linear program (Quint [8]), in short the PLP, is given by
(P ) : max
(yT )T2
X
T2
aTyT
s:t:
X
T2;T3i
yT = 1 for all i 2 N
yT  0 for all T 2 :
We denote by the PLP-III the PLP derived from the market with mid-
dlemen. We also denote by the PLP-II the PLP derived from the bilateral
market between sellers and buyers. Formally, the PLP-II is given by the
PLP under 0  ffigji 2 N1 [ N3g [ ffi; kgji 2 N1; k 2 N3g; and under
a0  (a0T )T20 2 Rn1+n3+n1n3+ satisfying (i) a0fig = afig for all i 2 N1; and (ii)
a0fi;kg = afi;j;kg for all i 2 N1, all j 2 N2 and all k 2 N3.7
Given an arbitrarily xed pair (i; k) 2 N1N3, let ik  Uk(!mi ) Uk(!di )
for all (m; d) 2 Jm Jd. For the transaction between seller i and buyer k, ik
is regarded as gross benet yielded by each middleman in Jm when ik > 0.
On the other hand, for the transaction between seller i and buyer k, we can
interpret  ik as gross benet yielded by each marketplace in Jd when ik < 0.
Next, we explain the established result by Quint [8]. This result plays an
important role in the proof of our results. The dual problem of (P ) is dened
as
(D) : min
(bi)i2N
X
i2N
bi
s:t:
X
i2T
bi  aT for all T 2 :
The following theorem is proved by Quint [8].
Quints Theorem The set of optimal solutions to (D) is non empty if and
only if (P ) solves integrally (i.e. with all 0s and 1s).
The rst result shows that transaction always takes place indirectly between
sellers and buyers through middlemen if (i) the net benet yielded by each
middleman is non-negative, and (ii) the number of middlemen is not less than
the number of potential assignments of goods.
Proposition 1 For all i 2 N1 and all k 2 N3, if ik   cm   (ci + ck) and
nm  minfn1; n3g, there always exists a competitive equilibrium with middle-
men.
7The PLP-II is given by max(yT )T20
P
T20 a
0
T yT subject to
P
T20;T3i yT = 1 for all
i 2 N and yT  0 for all T 2 0.
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Proof. Step 1: First, we show that the PLP-III always has an integral
solution. According to Quint [8], the PLP-II always has an integral solution.
Let y0 = (y0T )T20 2 Rn1+n3+n1n3 be an integral solution of the PLP-II. Let
f(i0s; k0s)gms=1 be all pairs (i0; k0) 2 N1  N3 such that y0fi0;k0g = 1. Note that
0  m  nm. Dene y = (yT )T2 2 Rn+n1n2n3 such that yfi0s;jms ;k0sg = y0fi0s;k0sg
for all s = 1; : : : ;m, yfig = 1  
P
k2N3 y
0
fi;kg for all i 2 N1, yfjg = yfkg = 0
for all j 2 N2 and all k 2 N3, and yfi;j;kg = 0 otherwise. Let y = (yT )T2 2
Rn+n1n2n3 be a vector which satises the constraints of the PLP-III. Dene
y00 = (y00T )T20 2 Rn1+n3+n1n3 such that y00fi;kg =
P
j2N2 yfi;j;kg for all i 2 N1
and all k 2 N3, y00fig = yfig for all i 2 N1. Since y0 is an integral solution
of the PLP-II and y00 satises the constraints of the PLP-II,
P
T2 aTyT =P
T20 a
0
Ty
00
T 
P
T20 a
0
Ty
0
T =
P
T2 aTy

T . Therefore y
 is an integral solution
of the PLP-III.
Step 2: Let y^ be a vector in Zn1+n1n2n3+ such that y^i  yfig for all i 2 N1 and
y^ijk  yfi;j;kg for all fi; j; kg 2 . Let SP be the set of all y^: Let C be given by
the set of utility vectors (u; v; w) 2 Rn satisfying (1) the -partition e¢ ciency
conditions: for y^ 2 f0; 1gn1+n1n2n3 ; ui + vj + wk = afi;j;kg if y^ijk = 1; ui =
afig if y^i = 1; (2) the stability conditions: ui + vj + wk  afi;j;kg if fi; j; kg 2 ;
ui  afig if i 2 N1; vj  afjg = 0 if j 2 N2; wk  afkg = 0 if k 2 N3. Using the
Quints theorem and the complementary slackness condition, we will show that
the set C is not empty. Let us recall the complementary slackness condition
(Dantzig [12], pp.135-136): Let y be a vector which satises the constraints
of (P ). Let b be a vector which satises the constraints of (D). Then y is a
solution of (P ) and b is a solution of (D) if and only if
P
T2 yT (
P
i2T bi aT ) =
0. There exists a y^; which is derived from an integral solution y for (P ). By
the Quints theorem, the set of optimal solutions to (D) is nonempty. Fix
an arbitrary (u0; v0; w0) 2 D. It is su¢ cient to show that (u0; v0; w0) satises
(i) u0i + v
0
j + w
0
k = afi;j;kg if y^ijk = 1 and (ii) u
0
i = afig if y^i = 1. By the
complementary slackness condition, u0i + v
0
j + w
0
k = afi;j;kg if y^ijk = 1 and
u0i = afig if y^i = 1, which completes the proof of the claim.
Step 3: Let y^ 2 SP : Then we have that vj = 0 for j 2 N2 such that
y^ijk = 0 for all i 2 N1 and all k 2 N3. Furthermore, vm = vm0 for m;m0 2 Jm
with m 6= m0, and vd = vd0 for d; d0 2 Jd with d 6= d0. The proof is omitted
since it is matter of simple calculation.
Next, x an arbitrary (u; v; w) 2 C. We set a price list (p^; q^) satisfying
p^mi = ui for all i 2 N1, p^di = ui + ci for all i 2 N1, q^mi = ui + vjm + cm for all
(i; jm) 2 N1  Jm and q^di = ui + vjd + ci for all (i; jd) 2 N1  Jd. Note that q^
is well-dened by Step 3.
Step 4: The rest of the proof is to show that (p^; q^; y^) is a competitive
equilibrium yielding the competitive outcome (u; v; w). Let y^i = xi , y^ijk =
xijk = ~x

ijk and
P
k2N3 y^ijk = ~x

ij. Note that A1, A2 and A3 are satised.
The basic line of our proof is almost the same as Shapley and Shubik [1]. We
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will discuss the di¤erent part from the proof of Shapley and Shubik.
Substep 4.1: Fix an arbitrary middleman jm 2 Jm. We will show that
middleman jm obtains q^mi   p^mi   cm or 0.
Case 1: ~xijk = 0 for all i 2 N1 and all k 2 N3. In this case, 0  q^mi   p^mi   cm
must be satised. We can check it since 0 = vj = (ui+vj)  ui = q^mi   p^mi  cm:
Case 2: There exists a pair (i; k) 2 N1N3 such that ~xijmk = 1 and ~xi0jmk0 = 0
for all (i0; k0) 2 N1  N3 with (i0; k0) 6= (i; k). In this case, q^mi   p^mi   cm 
q^mi0   p^mi0   cm for all i0 2 N1 n fig; and q^mi   p^mi   cm  0 must be satised. We
can check it since q^mi   p^mi   cm = (ui + vjm)  ui = vjm = (ui0 + vjm)  ui0 =
q^mi0   p^mi0   cm; and vjm  0:
Substep 4.2: Fix an arbitrary middleman jd 2 Jd. By Step 3, middleman
jd always obtains 0. Therefore, q^di   p^di = vjd = 0 for all i 2 N1.
Proposition 2 A competitive equilibrium with middlemen is Pareto e¢ cient.
Proof. We show that each competitive outcome of the market belongs to
the core of the induced assignment game. In the induced game, one considers
a restricted set of feasible coalitions, the ones of size 1 (seller not selling,
middleman not matching, or buyer not buying) and coalitions fi; j; kg of size
3 that coincide with a seller i selling one unit of goods to a middleman j who
sells himself the goods to k.
Let (p^; q^; x^) be a competitive equilibrium. One can check straightforwardly
that the competitive outcome (u^; v^; w^) is individually rational, that is, u^i 
Ui(!i), v^j  0, w^k  Uk(0) = 0 for all i 2 N1, all j 2 N2 and all k 2 N3. If the
outcome (u^; v^; w^) is blocked, it must be the case that there exists (i; j; k) 2
N1  Jm N3 such that
u^i + v^j + w^k < afi;j;kg = Uk(xijk)  cm:
It holds
Uk(xijk)  cm = pmi + ( pmi + qmi   cm) + (Uk(xijk)  qmi ) :
From the denition of equilibrium, it must be the case that u^i  pmi , v^j 
 pmi + qmi   cm, and w^k  Uk(xijk)  qmi , which is a contradiction.
Corollary 1 The set of competitive equilibria with middlemen coincides with
the core.
Proof. By Step 2 in the proof of Proposition 1, it is obvious that the core
belongs to the set of competitive equilibria with middlemen. By the proof of
Proposition 2, the set of competitive equilibria with middlemen belongs to the
core.
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In contrast, the following result shows that transaction always takes place
directly between sellers and buyers if the net benet yielded by each market-
place is non-negative.
Proposition 3 For all i 2 N1 and all k 2 N3, if  ik   (ci + ck)   cm,
there always exists a competitive equilibrium without middlemen.
Proof. It is su¢ cient to show that if ci + ck   ik for all i 2 N1 and
all k 2 N3 then the competitive outcome of each dummy middleman is zero.
Assume nd  minfn1; n3g. It is clear that there always exists a competitive
equilibrium of the market with dummy middlemen, since the proof is the same
as Proposition 1. Next, we show vj = 0 for all j 2 Jd if nd > minfn1; n3g:
Let y be an integral solution of the PLP-III. Let y^ be a vector in SP
such that y^i  yfig for all i 2 N1 and y^ijk  yfi;j;kg for all fi; j; kg 2 .
Using the constraints of the PLP-III, we have
P
i2N1
P
j2N2
P
k2N3 y^

ijk =P
i2N1
P
j2N2
P
k2N3 y

fi;j;kg =
P
i2N1(1   yfig) = n1  
P
i2N1 y

fig  n1. Sim-
ilarly, we have
P
k2N3
P
i2N1
P
j2N2 y^

ijk = n3  
P
k2N3 y

fkg  n3. Thus,P
i2N1
P
j2N2
P
k2N3 y^

ijk  minfn1; n3g < nd. Suppose that for all j 2 Jd
there exists a pair (i; k) 2 N1N3 such that y^ijk = 1. Then
P
j2N2
P
i2N1
P
k2N3
y^ijk =
P
j2Jd
P
i2N1
P
k2N3 y^

ijk 
P
j2Jd 1 = nd, which is a contradiction.
Therefore there exists j 2 Jd such that y^i0jk0 = 0 for all (i0; k0) 2 N1  N3,
which implies vj = 0 for all j 2 Jd because of Step 3 in the proof of Proposition
1.
Remark 1 As shown in Shapley and Shubik [1], the set of competitive equi-
libria without middlemen coincides with the core.
Corollary 2 For all i 2 N1 and all k 2 N3, if ik   cm   (ci + ck) and
nm > minfn1; n3g, the competitive outcome of each middleman in Jm is zero.
Proof. It is obvious by Proposition 1 and the same argument as Proposition
3.
Finally, we show that the incentives of middlemen to enter the market
always exist under the situation where the number of middlemen is equal to
the number of the potential assignments of goods.
Proposition 4 For all i 2 N1, all m 2 Jm, and all k 2 N3, if
ik   cm >  (ci + ck), Uk(!mi )  cm > Ui(!i), and nm = minfn1; n3g,
there always exists a competitive equilibrium with middlemen who gain positive
utility outcomes.
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Proof. By Proposition 1, there exist y^ 2 SP , and (u; v; w) 2 C, which yields
a competitive equilibrium (p^; q^; x), where x = ((xi )i2N1 ; (x

ijk)i2N1;j2N2;k2N3).
By ik  cm >  (ci+ ck), nm = minfn1; n3g and Proposition 1, for all m 2 JmP
i
P
k x

imk = 1, and for all d 2 Jd
P
i
P
k x

idk = 0. By Step 3 in the proof of
Proposition 1, for m;m0 2 Jm with m 6= m0 vm = vm0, and for d; d0 2 Jd with
d 6= d0 vd = vd0 = 0. If vm > 0 for all m 2 Jm, there is nothing to prove.
In the following argument, let vm = 0 for all m 2 Jm. Fix an arbitrary
i 2 N1 and an arbitrary k 2 N3. Since Uk(!mi )   cm > Ui(!i), it is su¢ cient
to consider the case where for all m0 2 Jm such that xim0k = 1, ui > Ui(!i)
or wk > 0. Let u^i = ui    and v^m = vm +  for enough small  > 0 if
ximk = 1 and ui > Ui(!i). Let w^k = wk    and v^m = vm +  for enough
small  > 0 if ximk = 1, ui = Ui(!i) and wi > 0. Otherwise, u^i = ui,
v^j = vj, and w^k = wk for all (i; j; k) 2 f(i; j; k) 2 N1  N2  N3 : xijk = 0g.
Furthermore, we must show the following claim: for all (i; d; k) 2 N1N2N3
ui+vd+ wk > afi;d;kg. Since ik cm >  (ci+ck), Uk(!mi ) cm > Uk(!di ) ci ck,
which implies afi;m;kg > afi;d;kg. By Step 3 in the proof of Proposition 1,
vd = 0. Since (u; v; w) 2 C, ui + vm + wk = ui + wk  afi;m;kg. Thus,
ui+vd+ wk = ui+ wk  afi;m;kg > afi;d;kg, which is the desired claim. Therefore,
(u^; v^; w^) 2 C, which yields the competitive equilibrium (p^; q^; x):
The following example illustrates that the competitive outcome of each
middleman is not necessarily zero.
Example 3 Let N1 = fi1; i2; i3g, N3 = fk1; k2; k3g and N2 = Jm [ Jd, where
Jm = fjm1 ; jm2 ; jm3 g and Jd = fjd1 ; jd2 ; jd3g. Let the utility functions of all agents
be given by (i) Ui(!i) = 30 for all i 2 N1; (ii) Uk1(!mi1 ) = 120 for all m 2 Jm
; (iii) Uk2(!
m
i2
) = 150 for all m 2 Jm; (iv) Uk3(!mi3 ) = 180 for all m 2 Jm; (v)
Uk(!
j
i ) = 60; otherwise. Let the costs of all agents be given by (i) ci = 10 for all
i 2 N1; (ii) cm = 20; (iii) ck = 10 for all k 2 N3. There exists a competitive
equilibrium price (p^; q^) such that (i) p^mi1 = 30, p^
m
i2
= 40, and p^mi3 = 50; (ii)
p^di1 = 40, p^
d
i2
= 50, and p^di3 = 60; (iii) q^
m
i1
= 100, q^mi2 = 110, and q^
m
i3
= 120;
(iv) q^di1 = 40, q^
d
i2
= 50, and q^di3 = 60. Given this equilibrium price, we have
competitive outcome (u^; v^; w^) satisfying (i) u^i1 = 30, u^i2 = 40, u^i3 = 50; (ii)
v^m = 50 for all m 2 Jm, and v^d = 0 for all d 2 Jd; (iii) w^k1 = 20, w^k2 = 40
and w^k3 = 60.
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